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Abstract
Rule of Evidence 609, which governs the admission of prior convictions of a witness for purposes of
impeachment, occupies an important place in the day to day operation of American criminal trials. The rule is
a compromise that reflects these competing values. It admits some prior convictions but not all. Crimen falsi
offenses such as perjury and fraud are automatically admissible under 609(a)(2). All other felonies are
analyzed under the balancing test of 609(a)(1), which allows the admission of a defendant-witness's crimes if
the “probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” The rule seeks
to strike a balance, but Minnesota courts have upset that balance. Indeed, in Minnesota, the flexible, case-
specific balancing test has been largely written out of the rule, replaced by a mechanical test that admits nearly
all felonies for impeachment. Minnesota cases interpreting Rule 609 have departed from standards that prevail
in other jurisdictions and also from the text itself. The aim of this article is to diagnose the specific points of
departure and to suggest reconsideration of Minnesota's current Rule 609 jurisprudence.
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MINNESOTA'S DISTORTION OF RULE 609
Ted Sampsell-Jones'
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule of Evidence 609, which governs the admission of prior
convictions of a witness for purposes of impeachment, occupies an important
place in the day to day operation of American criminal trials. The rule
ostensibly admits prior convictions for one purpose only - to show the
witness's bad character for truthfulness.2 But especially when admitted
against criminal defendants who take the stand, the use of prior convictions
for impeachment presents a risk that juries will use the evidence for an
improper purpose. As Justice Stevens once put it:
When the prior conviction is used to impeach a defendant
who elects to take the stand to testify in his own behalf, two
inferences, one permissible and the other impermissible,
inevitably arise. The fact that the defendant has sinned in the
past implies that he is more likely to give false testimony
than other witnesses; it also implies that he is more likely to
have committed the offense for which he is being tried than
if he had previously led a blameless life. The law approves
of the former inference but not the latter.4
Juries are duly instructed to consider only the former inference and
not the latter, but relevance is not so easily cabined. A substantial body of
social science evidence suggests that jurors regularly use Rule 609 evidence
I Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. Thanks to Peter
Thompson, Eileen Scallen, and Davi Axelson for their helpful comments. Thanks to Stephanie
Seidl for her research assistance.
2 Rule 609 allows impeachment by showing a generally bad character for
truthfulness. It is thus an exception to the general rule barring character evidence. See FED. R.
EvD. 404(a)(3). Character-based impeachment is only one method of impeachment. Others
include showing prior inconsistent statements, showing bias or self-interest, showing impaired
capacity of perception or memory, or contradicting the substance of testimony. See United
States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing WRIGHT & GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6094 (1990)). For an explanation of the difference between
character-based impeachment and other methods, see GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 242 (2002).
3 Rule 609 applies to all witnesses who take the stand. Under the rule, any
witness, including but not limited to criminal defendants, can be impeached by prior
convictions. See FED. R. EviD. 609; MINN. R. Evm. 609. Applying the rule to criminal
defendants presents special problems, however, because it creates a risk of conviction on
improper grounds. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KmKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.29
at 492 (3d ed. 2003) ("Few areas have proved more difficult than impeachment by prior
conviction, particularly for criminal defendants who testify."). In part for that reason, most
litigation surrounding Rule 609 involves its application to defendant-witnesses, and that
application will be the focus of this essay.
4 United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.).
[Vol. 31:2
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for impermissible purposes. A defendant "who has a 'record' but who thinks
he has a defense to the present charge, thus faces a harsh dilemma:" He must
either give up his right to present his defense through his own testimony, or
he must put his past crimes before the jury.6
Rule 609 evidence thus threatens the goal of accurate verdicts in two
ways: first, if a defendant testifies, Rule 609 evidence creates a risk of
conviction on improper grounds; and second, if a defendant forgoes
testifying to avoid the that risk, Rule 609 works to deprive the jury of a
potentially important source of information.7 Balanced against these risks,
however, is the rule's legitimate salutary function: It allows juries to better
judge the credibility of witnesses, including defendant-witnesses.
8
5 Forty years ago, Kalven and Zeisel's classic study on the jury cast doubt on the
idea that jurors consider prior convictions only for the permissible purpose of impeachment.
HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 143-48, 161 (1966). Since then,
numerous empirical studies have lent additional support to Kalven and Zeisel's conclusion.
See, e.g., Clary & Shaffer, Effects of Evidence Withholding and a Defendant's Prior Record
on Juridic Decisions, 112 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 237 (1980); Anthony N. Doob & Hershi
Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of S. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act
Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88 (1972); Edith M. Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence
of Prior Record Evidence on Judicial Decisionmaking, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67 (1995);
Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235 (1976); Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The
Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation
Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734; Roselle L Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of
Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW
& HuM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
For an impressive recent review of, and additional contribution to, the empirical
literature, see Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand:
The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes (Aug.
8, 2007) (Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 07-012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=998529 (follow "Social Science Resource Network" hyperlink).
6 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, at 77 (6th ed.
2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; see also Alan D. Hornstein; Between a Rock
and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 1 (1997) (discussing how Rule 609 evidence burdens a defendant's right to present a
defense).
7 See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL
TRIAL 1-9 (2003) (discussing the evolution of the Anglo-American adversary system and the
role of the criminal defendant's testimony at trial).
8 For a critical discussion of the character-based theory of impeachment reflected
in Rule 609, see H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DuKE L.J. 776, 791-93 (1993). Many commentators have
proposed repealing or amending the rule. See, e.g., Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong With
Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction
Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment
Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality and Situation, 43 DuKE L.J. 816
(1994); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules
404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135 (1989).
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The rule is a compromise that reflects these competing values. 9 It
admits some prior convictions but not all. Crimen falsi offenses such as
perjury and fraud are automatically admissible under 609(a)(2).' ° All other
felonies are analyzed under the balancing test of 609(a)(1), which allows the
admission of a defendant-witness's crimes if the "probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused."" The
rule seeks to strike a balance.
Minnesota courts have upset that balance. Indeed, in Minnesota, the
flexible, case-specific balancing test has been largely written out of the rule,
replaced by a mechanical test that admits nearly all felonies for
impeachment. Minnesota cases interpreting Rule 609 have departed from
standards that prevail in other jurisdictions and also from the text itself. The
aim of this article is to diagnose the specific points of departure and to
suggest reconsideration of Minnesota's current Rule 609 jurisprudence.
H. BACKGROUND: THE GORDON TEST
Minnesota's distortion of Rule 609 stems from its misapplication of
the Gordon test. The Gordon test, derived from Warren Burger's opinion in
Gordon v. United States, is the dominant framework used by state and
federal courts interpreting Rule 609(a)(1). 12 In Gordon, then-Judge Burger
sought to "give some assistance to the trial judge to whom we have assigned
the extremely difficult task of weighing and balancing" the probative value
and prejudicial effect of prior convictions offered for impeachment. 13 He
noted five factors that should be considered as part of the balancing test:
(1) The impeachment value of the prior crime: "In
common human experience acts of deceit, fraud,
cheating, or stealing, for example, are universally
regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a
man's honesty and integrity. Acts of violence on the
other hand, which may result from a short temper, a
combative nature, extreme provocation, or other
9 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 42, at 187 ("The Federal Rule
governing impeachment by proof of conviction of crime is the product of compromise.").
10 Under Federal Rule 609(a)(2), "evidence that any witness has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be determined that
establishing the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or
false statement by the witness."
11 FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(1).
12 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Gordon relied
heavily on the D.C. Circuit's previous ruling in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768
(D.C. Cir. 1965). For that reason, the test is sometimes referred to as the "Luck-Gordon" test.
13 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 941. For a helpful overview of the Gordon test, see
Rodeick Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Suggested Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 907,942-949 (1980).
[Vol. 31:2
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causes, generally have little or no direct bearing on
honesty and veracity."' 4
(2) The staleness of the prior conviction: 'The nearness
or remoteness of the prior conviction is also a factor
of no small importance. Even one involving fraud or
stealing, for example, if it occurred long before and
has been followed by a legally blameless life, should
generally be excluded on the ground of
remoteness. 15
(3) The similarity between the past crime and the
charged crime: "[S]trong reasons arise for excluding
those which are for the same crime because of the
inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that 'if he
did it before he probably did so this time.' As a
general guide, those convictions which are for the
same crime should be admitted sparingly .... ,,16
(4) The importance of defendant's testimony: "One
important consideration is what the effect will be if
the defendant does not testify out of fear of being
prejudiced because of impeachment by prior
convictions. Even though a judge might find that the
prior convictions are relevant to credibility and the
risk of prejudice to the defendant does not warrant
their exclusion, he may nevertheless conclude that it
is more important that the jury have the benefit of
the defendant's version of the case than to have the
defendant remain silent out of fear of
impeachment."
7
(5) The centrality of the credibility issue: "[B]ecause the
case had narrowed to the credibility of two persons -
the accused and his accuser - and in those
circumstances there was greater, not less,
compelling reason for exploring all avenues which
would shed light on which of the two witnesses was
to be believed."'
8
When Congress drafted Rule 609, its discretionary balancing
approach was based largely on the approach developed by the D.C. Circuit in
cases like Gordon.9 In part for that reason, the Gordon test has remained
14 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940.
15 Id.
16 id.
17 Id. at 940-41.
18 Id. at 941.
19 See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States
v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 941-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J.); Dodson, supra note 8,
2008]
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influential in post-Rules jurisprudence. 20 The Gordon test continues to
operate as an interpretive gloss on the probativeness-prejudice balancing test
mandated by 609(a)(1). 2 1 Many American jurisdictions use the five-factor
Gordon test to assess prior convictions offered under 609(a)(1). 22 Others use
similar multi-factor tests with slight variations.23 At one point, the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules considered amending Rule 609 to
incorporate a multi-factor test based on Gordon but declined to do so "on the
ground that it simply codified what Courts were generally doing under the
Rule already." 24
Minnesota, like many other states, employs the Gordon test. 25
Minnesota courts use the five Gordon factors to analyze evidence offered
under Minnesota Rule 609(a)(1), which is substantially the same as Federal
at 4.; Ed Gainor, Note, Character Evidence By Any Other Name...: A Proposal to Limit
Impeachment By Prior Conviction Under Rule 609, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 762, 773 (1990).
20 See United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 617-18 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing
Gordon's influence); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 6.31, at 496-99 (3d ed. 2003)
(same).
21 "Since the federal Rules of Evidence have been codified, the federal courts
have used those factors described in Gordon in determining the outcome of the balancing test
for felonies." People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 513 (Mich. 1988).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Gant, 396 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pritchard,
973 F.2d 905, 909 (lth Cir. 1992); United States v. Meyers, 952 F.2d 914, 916-17 (6th Cir.
1992); Gov't of the Virgin Is. v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982); United States
v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 695 n.30 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867,
872 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1208 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
United States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50, 53 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 14
(Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 417 N.E.2d 950, 955 (Mass. 1981); Peterson v. State,
518 So.2d 632, 636 (Miss. 1987), State v. Eugene, 340 N.W.2d 18, 34 (N.D. 1983); State v.
McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 585 (Or. 1984); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.05[2][a] (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EvIDENCE].
23 Gov't of the Virgin Is. v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982);
People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 114 (Cal. 1985); Label Sys. Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 852
A.2d 703, 720 (Conn. 2004); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ill. 2001); State v. Axiotis,
569 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Iowa 1997); State v. Smith, 553 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996).
Several states have different versions of Rule 609 that do not involve any balancing
test. Some states, for example, admit only crimes involving dishonesty and categorically
exclude all others. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EvID. 609(a); HAW. R. EvID. 609(a). Other states
categorically admit all felonies without regard to any balancing test. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-90-101. For discussions of the differing approaches used by different states, see
Allen, 420 N.W. 2d at 518-20; Dodson, supra note 8, at 12-28; Dannye W. Holley, Federalism
Gone Far Astray from Policy and Constitutional Concerns: The Admission of Convictions to
Impeach by State's Rules--1990-2004, 2 TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 239, 256-93 (2006).
24 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1033
(2d ed. 1998).
25 The Minnesota Supreme Court first adopted the Gordon test in State v. Jones,
271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978). Minnesota courts occasionally refer to the test as the
"Jones test." See, e.g., State v. Hofmann, 549 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).HeinOnline -- 31 Hamline L. Rev. 410 2008
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Rule 609(a)( 1).26 But the Gordon test works differently in Minnesota than it
does elsewhere. Around the country, there is a substantial body of state and
federal case law applying the Gordon factors, and, despite some
jurisdictional variation, courts have developed a fairly consistent set of
norms for applying the Gordon factors. Minnesota courts, however, do not
adhere to those hornbook principles. When it comes to applying Rule 609
and the Gordon test, Minnesota is an outlier.
III. DIAGNOSING MINNESOTA'S DEPARTURE
Minnesota courts have, through a series of decisions, departed from
traditional Rule 609 analysis under the Gordon test. Each point of departure
would be, by itself, fairly inconsequential. But taken together, these
departures have distorted Rule 609. Both the rule itself and the Gordon gloss
are premised on notions of balance and discretion. Minnesota cases have lost
the proper sense of balance, and they have replaced a flexible discretionary
test with a more mechanical and one-sided rule.
A. Factor One: The Nature of the Offense and the "Whole Person"
The first factor of the five-factor Gordon test instructs courts to
assess "the impeachment value of the prior crime. 27 In Gordon itself, Judge
Burger noted that certain crimes such as fraud are highly probative of
character for truthfulness, while other crimes, including impulsive, violent
crimes, "have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.,' 28 Different
crimes, in other words, have varying degrees of probative value when used
for impeachment.
By dividing crimes into two categories, Rule 609 reflects the same
principle.29 Crimes such as perjury and fraud that involve "an act of
dishonesty or false statement," and thus bear directly on veracity, are
automatically admissible under 609(a)(2).3 ° Other felonies shed less light on
26 The federal version of the rule contains two different balancing tests, one for
defendant-witnesses and a looser 403 balancing test (that is, a test tilted more in favor of
admissibility) for all other witnesses. See FED. R. EvID. 609(a). Minnesota, by contrast, applies
the single, stricter test to all witnesses. See MINN. R. EviD. 609(a).
27 Jones, 271 N.W.2d at 538.
28 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
29 See FED. R. EviD. 609(a) advisory committee's note ("For purposes of
impeachment, crimes are divided into two categories by the rule .... $). The rule implicitly
treats a third category of offenses - misdemeanors not involving an act of false statement or
dishonesty - as automatically inadmissible if offered to show character for truthfulness. See
People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 516-17 (Mich. 1988).
30 See FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(2); MINN. R. EviD. 609(a)(2); see also MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 6.32, at 501 (stating that 609(a)(2) crimes "have special
probative worth on veracity" and so are "automatically admissible").
2008]
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veracity and thus are only admissible subject to the discretionary balancing
test of 609(a)(1).
31
Within the large category of crimes covered by 609(a)(1), 32 courts
have recognized further gradations of probative value.33 Rule 609(a)(1)
reflects a view that all serious crimes have some bearing on veracity, on the
theory that it is "improbable that one who undertakes to rob a bank with a
gun will prove to be a person of high character who is devoted to the truth. 34
As Judge Wald put it in her seminal opinion in United States v. Lipscomb,
"Rule 609(a)(1) incorporates a congressional belief that all felony
convictions . . . are somewhat probative of credibility, even crimes of
impulse ... ,35 But she was quick to add the following "important caveat":
[W]e have deliberately used the phrases "somewhat
probative" or "probative to some degree" for no stronger
statement could be made. Congress recognized, and it is
obvious, that some prior convictions have little relationship
to credibility while others are highly probative.36
In other words, even if all felonies shed some light on veracity, they do not
all shed the same amount of light.
Following Lipscomb, courts around the country have recognized
that, among 609(a)(1) offenses, "certain crimes are more strongly related to
truthfulness than others. 37 The large body of case law interpreting Rule
31 See FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1); MINN. R. EviD. 609(a)(1); see also MELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 6.30, at 494 (stating that 609(a)(1) covers crimes whose
connection to truthfulness is "less obvious").
32 Rule 609(a)(1) covers a broad class of crimes because Rule 609(a)(2) has a
fairly narrow application. See United States v. Cunningham, 638 F.2d 696, 698 (4th Cir. 1981)
("Rule 609(a)(2), however, is confined to a narrow class of crimes which by their nature bear
directly upon the witness' propensity to testify truthfully."); accord United States v. Brackeen,
969 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362 (D.C. Cir.
1976). At the federal level, Rule 609(a)(2) was amended in 2006 to confirm its limited scope.
See FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment ("The amendment is
meant to give effect to the legislative intent to limit the convictions that are to be
automatically admitted under subdivision (a)(2).").
33 Surratt, supra note 13, at 931-32.
34 United States v. Halbert, 668 F.2d 489, 495 (10th Cir. 1982); see also
MELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 6.30, at 494 ("FRE 609(a)(1) adopts the view that
convictions for serious crimes bear on credibility.").
35 United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
36 Id. at 1062.
37 People v. Allen, 420 N.W. 2d 499, 516 (Mich. 1988). For similar holdings, see,
for example, United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 617 (2nd Cir. 2005); Boyde v. Brown,
404 F.3d 1159, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Larsen, 596 F.2d 347, 348 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528, 534 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Cox, 536 F.2d 65, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 2006 WL 618843 at *2 (E.D.
Pa. March 13, 2006); United States v. Mahone, 328 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84-85 (D. Me. 2004);
State v. Spearin, 428 A.2d 381, 383 (Me. 1981); Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 493 N.E.2d 511,515
(Mass. App. Ct. 1986); State v. Trejo, 825 P.2d 1252, 1255-56 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); State v.HeinOnline -- 31 Hamline L. Rev. 412 2008
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609(a)(1) has produced some standard guidelines for identifying which
crimes have substantial probative value for truthfulness and which do not.
[Some crimes] fall relatively high on the scale of probative
worth on veracity, including especially crimes of theft and
receiving stolen property .... Others fall lower on the scale,
including especially crimes in which violence is the central
feature, which in turn embraces many sex offenses. Also low
on the scale are many drug crimes, and crimes against public
morality, such as prostitution.38
The first factor of the Gordon test is assessed on a sliding scale; probative
value under the first factor is a matter of degree. 
39
Minnesota courts, however, have departed from these guidelines and
tend to ignore the gradations of probative value among 609(a)(1) crimes. In
applying the first factor of the Gordon test, Minnesota courts rely on the
"whole person" doctrine.4° The doctrine, borrowed from pre-Rules
jurisprudence, holds that evidence of a prior conviction allows the jury to
"see 'the whole person' and thus to judge better the truth of his testimony.' 41
The object of a trial is not solely to surround an accused with
legal safeguards but also to discover the truth. What a person
is often determines whether he should be believed. When a
defendant voluntarily testifies in a criminal case, he asks the
jury to accept his word. No sufficient reason appears why
the jury should not be informed what sort of person is asking
them to take his word. In transactions of everyday life this is
probably the first thing that they would wish to know....
Lack of trustworthiness may be evinced by his abiding and
repeated contempt for laws which he is legally and morally
bound to obey ... though the violations are not concerned
McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 588-590 (Or. 1984); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992); 4 WEINSTEiN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 22, § 609.05[3][b].
38 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 6.31, at 597 (citing cases); see, e.g.,
Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rosales, 680 F.2d
1304, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 417-419 (4th Cir.
1981); United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Drug convictions, for example, are generally regarded as having minimal probative
value. United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1274-1276 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1971); State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1178-1179 (Wash.
1997); State v. Geyer, 480 A.2d 489, 497 (Conn. 1984); People v. Siebert, 390 N.E.2d 1322,
1328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); State v. Zaehringer, 325 N.W.2d 754, 757-758 (Iowa 1982);
Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 496 N.E.2d 166-170 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); Peterson v. State,
518 So. 2d 632, 637-638 (Miss. 1987).
39 See United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (stating
that when the crime is not one shedding much light on veracity, the first factor weighs
"against admitting them").
40 State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2007).
41 DiBucci, 229 N.W.2d at 508.
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solely with crimes involving "dishonesty and false
statement.
'42
The continuing validity of the whole person doctrine under Rule 609
is debatable.43 On one hand, the whole person doctrine seems to revive what
Wigmore called the "more primitive view of human nature" that led
eighteenth century courts to admit evidence of bad general character for
impeachment. 44 Wigmore himself infamously endorsed one use of bad
general character evidence for impeachment: evidence of a female accuser's
unchastity to show her lack of veracity in sexual assault cases.45 That
antiquated view has been thoroughly repudiated by Rule 412.46 More
generally, Rule 608 at least partially repudiates the view that all immoral acts
bear on veracity.47 To the extent that the whole person doctrine revives the
primitive view that any evidence of bad character is probative of
truthfulness, it is partly in tension with modem evidence law.48
On the other hand, the "primitive" view derided by Wigmore is
precisely the view adopted by Rule 609.49 As Judge Wald found in
42 State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn. 1979) (quoting State v. Duke,
123 A. 2d 745, 746 (N.H. 1956)).
43 Peter Thompson has described the Court's reliance on pre-Rules jurisprudence
in this context as "peculiar." I PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE-EVIDENCE §
609.02, at 338 n.26 (3d ed. 2001).
44 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 923, at 728 (Chadboum rev. ed. 1970); see also
id. § 980, at 828 ("If in a given jurisdiction general bad character is allowable for
impeachment ... then any offense will serve to indicate such bad character .... ). For an
early statement of that "primitive" view, see JEFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 159
(London Henry Lintot 1756) ("[W]here a Man is convicted of Falsehood and other Crimes
against the common Principles of Honesty and Humanity, his Oath is of no Weight."). Based
on that view, until the nineteenth century, most Anglo-American jurisdictions prevented
defendants from testifying under oath. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 42, at
74.
45 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a, at 736 ("The unchaste (let us call it)
mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of
which the narrator is the heroine or the victim.").
46 See FED. R. EvD. 412 (generally excluding evidence of an accuser's sexual
history orpredisposition); MINN. R. EviD. 412 (same).
7 Rule 608 allows a party to impeach a witness with specific instances of conduct
but only if those instances of conduct are "probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness." FED. R.
EVID. 608(b); accord MINN. R. EvID. 608(b). "FRE 608 and modem cases reject the broad
view" that "virtually any conduct indicating bad character also indicates untruthfulness."
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 6.25, at 481-82. For a discussion of the differences
between Rule 608 and Rule 609, see Donald H. Zeigler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 635.
48 "[T]he proper inquiry under ER 609(a)(1) is not whether the prior conviction
shows a 'non-law-abiding character' but whether it shows the witness is not truthful." State v.
Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Wash. 1997).
49 The Advisory Committee noted in its commentaries to the first draft that "[a]
demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted patterns is
translatable into willingness to give false testimony." STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG & KENNETH R.
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 557 (4th ed. 1986); see also People v. Allen,
420 N.W.2d 499, 506 (Mich. 1988).
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Lipscomb, Rule 609(a)(1) appears to incorporate the view that all felonies are
at least somewhat probative of truthfulness. 50 To the extent that the whole
person doctrine merely recognizes that conclusion, it is consistent with the
case law of other jurisdictions, and it is at least arguably consistent with
intent of the rule draftersi'
Putting that theoretical debate to one side, Minnesota's interpretation
of the first Gordon factor differs in a more concrete, more practical way.
Minnesota courts tend to cite the whole person doctrine for the proposition
that all crimes are relevant for impeachment, and thus that the first factor
always favors admission. In so doing, they rarely if ever recognize varying
degrees of impeachment. The Minnesota Supreme Court' s opinion in State v.
Gassler, upholding the admission of prior violent offenses for impeachment,
provides an example. 2 In analyzing the first Gordon factor, the court stated,
Generally, convictions for violent crimes lack the
impeachment value of crimen falsi. See e.g., Gordon, 383
F.2d at 940. However, trial courts have great discretion in
determining what prior convictions are admissible under the
balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1). Moreover, the fact that a
prior conviction did not directly involve truth or falsity does
not mean it has no impeachment value. We have stated that
impeachment by prior crime aids the jury by allowing it to
see the "whole person" and thus to judge better the truth of
his testimony.53
The Gassler court recognized in passing that violent crimes have less
probative value, but then cited the whole person doctrine as a compelling
counterargument, and concluded that the first Gordon factor favored
admission.
More regularly, especially in more recent cases, Minnesota courts do
not even recognize in passing that various crimes have varying degrees of
50 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. See also United States v.
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
51 The intent of the drafters, however, is not entirely certain. On the hard question
of "whether Rule 609(a)(1) incorporates a congressional belief that all felony convictions less
than 10 years old are somewhat probative of credibility," Judge Wald found both the text and
the legislative history of the rule to be uncertain. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1057-61; see also
David A. Sonenshein, Circuit Roulette: The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach Credibility
in Civil Cases Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 279, 294 (1988)
("It must be apparent ... that if the conviction is for a crime having nothing to do with
dishonesty, its revelation to the jury has virtually no relationship to the truth-telling as a
witness....").
52 State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 66-67 (Minn. 1993).
53 Id. at 66-67 (other citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For
similar holdings, see, for example, State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 487 (Minn. 1988); State v.
James, 638 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). In a few older cases, the Minnesota
Supreme Court appeared to more seriously acknowledge the limited impeachment value of
certain crimes, but nonetheless upheld admission. See, e.g., State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542,
546 (1980).
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probative value. Rather, they simply cite the whole person doctrine and
conclude that the first factor favors admission-period. The Minnesota
Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Ihnot, upholding the admission of sexual
assault convictions for impeachment, provides an example.54 Analyzing the
first Gordon factor, the Ihnot court stated simply,
[I]mpeachment by prior crime aids the jury by allowing
it to see the whole person and thus to judge better the truth
of his testimony. Here, evidence of past criminal misconduct
involving children could have been of assistance to the jury
in weighing the credibility of the defendant. The first
[Gordon] factor is satisfied on these facts.55
The Ihnot mode of analysis, which takes no account of varying degrees of
probative value, is now the norm in Minnesota courts.56
The idea that different crimes have different degrees of probative
value has been largely lost in Minnesota. Indeed, the idea that the nature of
the prior offense is important has been lost. Application of the first factor is
mechanical. It is simply a switch that is on or off, "satisfied" or "not
satisfied," and under the whole person doctrine, it is always satisfied.
B. Factor Two: Staleness
The second Gordon factor instructs courts to assess the staleness of a
prior conviction. Judge Burger instructed that convictions become less
probative as they age, and thus that older convictions generally should be
excluded as having little bearing on the witness's current veracity.57 The
same principle is reflected in Rule 609(b), which generally excludes
convictions older than ten years.58
54 State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586-88 (Minn. 1998).
55 Id. at 587 (citation omitted).
56 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2007) (admitting five
unnamed felonies, relying on the "whole person" doctrine); State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d
717, 728-29 (Minn. 2007) (admitting prior convictions of terroristic threats and fleeing a
police officer); State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006) (admitting prior
convictions of assault, among others); State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Minn. 2003)
(admitting convictions of assault, sexual assault, and drug offense); State v. Moorman, 505
N.W.2d 593, 604 (Minn. 1993) (admitting prior conviction of assault); State v. Amos, 347
N.W.2d 498, 502-03 (Minn. 1984) (admitting prior convictions of robbery and aggravated
rape); State v. Flemino, 721 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (admitting prior
convictions of burglary and drug possession); State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (admitting prior conviction of sexual assault).
57 See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
58 Under 609(b), crimes older than ten years are inadmissible "unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." FED. R. EVID.
609(b); accord MINN. R. EviD. 609(b).
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For convictions less than ten years old, remoteness is still a relevant
factor.59 As Judge Wald explained in Lipscomb, "Rule 609(b) reflects
Congress' belief that 'convictions over ten years old generally do not have
much probative value.' This implies that many 9-year-old convictions are
only slightly probative; probativeness does not suddenly vanish when the 10-
year mark is reached." 6 Following Lipscomb, most courts analyzing the
second Gordon factor recognize that even for those crimes younger than ten
years, "[t]he probative value of a conviction decreases as its age increases. '61
In other jurisdictions, staleness is a matter of degree.62
Once again, Minnesota courts generally do not recognize these
gradations. Minnesota courts simply hold that so long as a conviction falls
within the ten-year limit, the second Gordon factor is "satisfied" - that is, it
favors admission.63 The second Gordon factor, like the first Gordon factor, is
a binary inquiry, not a matter of degree.
Making matters worse, Minnesota courts interpret Rule 609(b) more
loosely than other jurisdictions. Rule 609(b) expresses a rule of presumptive
exclusion for stale convictions. The drafters of Federal Rules of Evidence
expressed an intent that convictions older than ten years should be admitted
"very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances, '" and most courts have
59 See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 942 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[B]oth Rule
609 and Rule 403, which is pertinent here, oblige the trial court to assess the probative value
of every prior conviction offered in evidence and the remoteness of a conviction, whatever its
age, is always pertinent to this assessment.").
60 United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting S.
REP. No. 93-1277, at 15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7061) (footnote
omitted).
61 4 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 22, § 609.05[3][c]. "FRE
609(b) creates in effect a presumption that a conviction more than ten years old should be
excluded, but even the age of a more recent conviction may tip the balance in favor of
exclusion." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 6.31, at 498. See also United States v.
Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[Tlhe conviction occurred less than two years prior
to Field's trial, thus being more probative of veracity than comparatively older crimes."); State
v. Gardner, 433 A.2d 249, 252 (Vt. 1981) ("Older crimes are less relevant to the issue of the
defendant's credibility.").
Thus, eight and nine year old convictions, even though they fall within the ten-year
limit, are more likely to be excluded. See, e.g., United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 419
(4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Paige, 464 F. Supp. 99, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Conversely,
more recent convictions are more likely to be admitted. See, e.g., United States v. Causey, 9
F.3d 1341, 1344 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 696 F.2d 578, 589 (8th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d
824, 828 (2d Cir. 1977).
62 Surratt, supra note 13, at 933-35.
63 See State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586 (Minn. 1998); Gassier, 505 N.W.2d at
67; State v. Garritsen, No. A04-59, 2004 WL 2856815, at * 5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004);
State v. Morrow, No. A04-126, 2004 WL 2796355, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2004); State
v. Thomas, No. CX-02-2007, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1189, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 23,
2003); State v. Lokken, No. C8-02-207, 2003 WL 174952, at * 2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 28,
2003); State v. James, 638 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Whiteside, 400
N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
64 S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7062.
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interpreted the provision accordingly.65 The standard in Minnesota is looser,
and Minnesota courts admit convictions older than ten years fairly
regularly.66
The principle that the probative value of convictions decreases with
age is reflected in both the text of Rule 609 and in the body of case law
interpreting the rule. In Minnesota, that principle carries less weight.
C. Factor Three: Similarity
The third Gordon factor instructs courts to assess the similarity
between the prior conviction and the charged offense. While the first two
factors are intended to measure the probative value of the prior conviction,
the third factor is intended to measure its potential for unfair prejudice.
Greater similarity produces a greater risk of unfair prejudice. Judge Burger
thus wrote that similar prior convictions should be "admitted sparingly"
because they produce "the inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that 'if
he did it before he probably did so this time."
67
State and federal courts around the country have repeatedly
reaffirmed that principle.68 "The generally accepted view.., is that evidence
65 See, e.g., United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 687 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Estes, 994 F.2d
147 (5th Cir. 1993); Beahm, 664 F.2d at 417; United States v. Butch, 48 F. Supp. 2d 453, 466
(D.N.J. 1999); State v. Hickey, 523 A.2d 60, 63 (N.H. 1986); see also MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, at § 6.36, at 513.
66 State v. Burke, No. C1-03-26, 2003 WL 2270593, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Nov. 28, 2004); State v. Jackson, 655 N.W.2d 828, 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); State v.
Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); Thirkield v. State, No. C9-00-
468, 2000 WL 1065037, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2000); State v. Grzeskowiak, No. CX-
99-66, 1999 WL 970373 at *1-2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1999). In several such cases,
Minnesota courts appear to apply the wrong standard. See, e.g., State v. Lilienfeld, No. C3-00-
532, 2001 WL 215716, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2001) ("Minn. R. Evid. 609(b)
nonetheless allows the trial court to admit as impeachment evidence a conviction occurring
more than 10 years ago if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect."). In Ihnot, the
Minnesota Supreme Court puzzlingly stated that 609(b) only "arguably embodies a more
stringent standard for admissibility." 575 N.W.2d at 584 (emphasis added).
67 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940
" See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1473 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Hans, 738 F.2d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414,
418-19 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 n.18 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ortiz, 553
F.2d 782, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1977); Spicer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 4:06-cv-0149-DFH-
WGH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60342, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2007); United States v.
Graves, No. 06-95-01, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47871, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2006); United
States v. Footman, 33 F.Supp.2d 60, 61-63 (D. Mass. 1998); United States v. Maisonneuve,
954 F. Supp. 114, 117 (D. Vt. 1997); People v. Rist, 545 P.2d 833, 839 (Cal. 1976); State v.
Harris, No. IN95-11-0494, IN95-11-0495, IN95-11-0496, IN95-11-0497, IN95-11-0498,
IN95-11-0499, 1996 Del. Super. LEXIS 336, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1996); People v.
Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166, 170 (Ill. 2001); State v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 2005);
State v. Roy, 385 A.2d 795, 797-98 (Me. 1978); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1092 (N.J.
1993); State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 716 (N.D. 2002); State v. Goney, 622 N.E.2d 688,
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of similar offenses for impeachment purposes under Rule 609 should be
admitted sparingly if at all."69
Minnesota courts, however, do not conform to that generally
accepted view. They regularly uphold the admission of similar priors for
impeachment.70 Minnesota courts give less weight to the third factor, and
moreover, they have narrowed the definition of similarity. The Minnesota
Supreme Court in Ihnot suggested that even a conviction for the same
offense does not count as "similar" so long as "the facts underlying each
charge are sufficiently different."'', Applying that rationale, the court held
that the third factor actually favored the admission of prior convictions that
were the same offense as the charged crime.72
In other jurisdictions, the third Gordon factor is interpreted to mean
that the similarity of crimes counts strongly against admission. In Minnesota,
by contrast, the third Gordon factor has been interpreted to support the
admission of the very same offense for impeachment. Minnesota's
application of the third factor marks another significant departure from
generally prevailing norms of Rule 609 jurisprudence.
D. Factors Four and Five: Cancellation or Combination
The combined application of the fourth and fifth Gordon factors is
strange even outside of Minnesota. Under the fourth factor, the importance of
691 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Green v. State, 527 S.E.2d 98, 101 (S.C. 2000); State v. Hardy, 946
P.2d 1175, 1180 (Wash. 1997).
To be sure, not all jurisdictions take such a restrictive approach. See, e.g., Griffin v.
State, 823 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Ark. 1992) ("When a defendant chooses to testify, we have
consistently allowed prior convictions to be used for impeachment, even when the convictions
are of crimes similar to the charged offense."). Even when admitting similar prior convictions,
however, most courts at least note that similarity is a factor that weighs in favor of exclusion.
See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 106 F.3d 737,740 (7th Cir. 1997).
69 United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1992); accord 4
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 22, § 609.05[3][d].
70 Minnesota courts "have been liberal in admitting prior convictions for
impeachment even when the prior crime is the same as the crime charged." State v. Stanifer,
382 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). See also, e.g., State v. Frank, 364 N.W.2d 398,
399 (Minn. 1985) (upholding the admission of prior rape convictions in a rape case); State v.
Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980) (upholding the admission of a prior rape
conviction in a rape case); State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702, 708 (Minn. 1979) (upholding
the admission of a rape conviction in a rape case); State v. Steeprock, No. A04-1016, 2005
Minn. App. LEXIS 615, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 7, 2005) (upholding the admission of a
prior assault in an assault case); State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (upholding the admission of a prior rape conviction in a rape case).
71 State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d, 581, 587 (Minn. 1998) (upholding the admission of
a prior rape conviction in a rape case); accord State v. Feneis, No. C2-00-859, 2001 Minn.
App. LEXIS 199, at *8-10 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2001) (upholding the admission of prior
drug offenses in a drug case).
72 In the court's words, despite the fact that the prior conviction was for the same
offense, the third factor was "satisfied" because the facts were sufficiently different. Ihnot,
575 N.W.2d at 587.
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a defendant's testimony favors exclusion of priors because admission might
dissuade him from testifying. Under the fifth factor, the importance of a
defendant's credibility favors admission of prior convictions because its
admission will shed more light on credibility.
The combined application of these two factors is strange for two
reasons. First, it is unclear whether the factors really measure probative value
and prejudicial effect or whether they are "merely restatements of the
conflicting interests that Congress balanced in adopting the rule. 7 3 Second,
the two factors seem to simply cancel each other out regardless of the
circumstances of the case.74 As the Oregon Supreme Court noted,
We recognize that factors (4) and (5) relating to the
importance of the testimony to the defendant and the
impeachment evidence to the state usually offset each other
in a criminal case and, therefore, do not require comments or
findings of the trial judge as required by factors (1), (2) and
(3).
As one of these factors increases in importance in a
particular case, so does the other. For example, if a case
boils down to a "swearing match" between the defendant
and the victim - a situation in which only one of the
witnesses can be telling the truth - both sides can make a
strong argument under factors (4) and (5).75
This anomaly of the Gordon test, however, is harmless. If the fourth and fifth
factors offset each other, then they should not affect the outcome.76
In Minnesota, however, the fourth and fifth factors do not offset
because the application of the fourth factor has been turned on its head.
Other jurisdictions apply the fourth factor to mean that the importance of the
defendant's testimony favors exclusion.7 7 That is, after all, what Judge
73 Surratt, supra note 13, at 943.
74 "When one [of these two factors] increases in importance, the other does also,
and there appears to be no principled way to determine which factor should prevail." Id. at
945; see also Bruce P. Garren, Note, Impeachment By Prior Conviction: Adjusting to Federal
Rule of Evidence 609, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 416, 435 n. 114 (1979) (observing "as the need for
the defendant's testimony becomes more critical, so does the credibility issue").
75 State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 591 (Or. 1984) (footnotes omitted). The
Maryland Supreme Court has also puzzled over the fourth and fifth factors, suggesting that
"these two factors can be interpreted to weigh either for or against admitting prior
convictions." Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 16 (Md. 1995).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 54 (E.D. Tenn. 1978)
(concludin "Ifactors four and five seem to counterbalance each other in this case").
See United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Powell, No. 01-20021-01-KHV, 2004 WL 1534176 at *10 (D. Kan. May 10, 2004); United
States v. Chant, No. CR 94-0049 SBA, 1997 WL 231105 at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 1997); State
v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1987); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 6.31,
at 499; 4 WEINsTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 22, § 609.05[3][e]; Surratt, supra note
13, at 937-38. But see United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1987)
(reversing the fourth factor).
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Burger intended.78 But Minnesota courts apply the fourth factor to mean that
the importance of the defendant's testimony favors admission.79 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that "[i]f credibility is a central issue in
the case, the fourth and fifth [Gordon] factors weigh in favor of admission of
the prior convictions., 80 The court has never explained why it flipped the
application of the fourth factor. 8'
As they are applied in most jurisdictions, the fourth and fifth Gordon
factors tend to offset one another. As they are applied in Minnesota, the
fourth and fifth Gordon factors double-count the same value and both favor
admission. The reversed fourth factor marks yet another departure from the
rules that prevail in other jurisdictions.
E. Overall Function: Guidance or Control
Rule 609 and the Gordon test are premised on notions of flexibility,
balance, and trial court discretion. The rule itself is the product of a hard-
fought political debate that resulted in a compromise.82 Rather than
mechanically admitting or excluding all prior offenses, the rule adopted an
"intermediate view" that "permits the introduction of the defendant's prior
convictions in the discretion of the judge. 83
Rule 609(a)(1), which covers most felonies, mandates a balancing
test. It makes felonies admissible against a testifying defendant "if the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the accused."' 84 That language is simply a modified and
78 As Judge Burger stated in explaining the rationale of the fourth factor:
Even though a judge might find that the prior convictions are relevant to
credibility and the risk of prejudice to the defendant does not warrant their
exclusion, he may nevertheless conclude that it is more important that the
jury have the benefit of the defendant's version of the case than to have
the defendant remain silent out of fear of impeachment.
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Gainor,
supra note 19, at 783 (discussing the proper application of the fourth factor).
79 See, e.g., State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Minn. 2007); State v.
Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Minn. 2003); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998);
State v. Mitchell, 687 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v. James, 638 N.W.2d
205, 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Garritsen, No. A04-59, 2004 WL 2856815 at *5
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004).
80 State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006).
81 In earlier cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted the fourth factor
consistently with Gordon - that is, the court had interpreted the fourth as weighing in favor of
exclusion. See, e.g., State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980). The court appears to
have changed its interpretation of the fourth factor for the first time in Ihnot. It did so without
explanation. See State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998).
82 For extensive discussions of the legislative history of the federal rule, see
Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of
Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2310-21 (1994).
83 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 42, at 88.
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more restrictive form of the Rule 403 balancing test.85 As with the Rule 403
balancing test, the Rule 609 balancing test should be a case-specific inquiry
largely committed to the discretion of the trial judge.86
Wise judges may come to differing conclusions in similar
situations. Even the same item of evidence may fare
differently from one case to the next, depending on its
relationship to the other evidence in the case, the importance
of the issues on which it bears, and the likely efficacy of
cautionary instructions to the jury. Accordingly, much
leeway is given trial judges who must fairly weigh probative
value against probable dangers.87
But discretion is not absolute under either Rule 403 or Rule 609. Discretion
is guided, and ought to be guided, by principles developed in appellate
opinions.
The Gordon test serves to guide discretion. The goal of the test was,
as Judge Burger said, "give some assistance to the trial judge" who is
assigned the task of weighing probative value against prejudicial effect.88 But
while giving guidance and assistance, Gordon still emphasized flexibility
and discretion. The Gordon factors were not intended as "firm guidelines"
because, as Judge Burger cautioned, "the very nature of judicial discretion
precludes rigid standards. 89 Moreover, Judge Burger noted that the five
factors he mentioned were not an exhaustive list, and that "there are many
other factors that may be relevant in deciding whether or not to exclude prior
convictions in a particular case."
9 °
Most jurisdictions that employ the Gordon test maintain that spirit of
flexibility in several ways. First, as described above, the various factors are
measured on sliding scales.9' It is not the case that a certain factor either does
85 While Rule 609 requires exclusion if the danger of prejudice outweighs
probative value, Rule 403 only allows exclusion if the danger of prejudice substantially
outweighs probative value. See United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 160 (1st Cir. 2004); State
v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 674, 676 n. 1 (Iowa 2005); RONALD J. ALLEN ET. AL, EvIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, AND CASES 373 (4th ed. 2006); Uviller, supra note 8, at 799-800.
86 Academic literature on evidence law is rich with theoretical examinations of
the nature of judicial discretion. See generally Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to
Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 59 (1984); David P. Leonard, Power
and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937 (1990); Thomas M. Mengler, The
Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REv. 413 (1989); Maurice
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv.
635 (1971); Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer's Triumph,
88 CAUF. L. REv. 2437 (2000); Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of
Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097, 1100 (1985).
87 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 185, at 739-40.
88 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 941; see also State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 483
n.9 (Wis. 2004) ("[T]he listed factors are merely elements to be considered when applying the
'particularized application' of the [Rule 403] balancing test under [Rule 609].").
89 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 941.
9 Id. at 940.
91 See supra sections III.A. and Il.B.
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or does not favor admissibility; rather, it favors admissibility to some degree.
92Second, different factors have different weight in different cases. The five
factors are not always given equal weight, and in some cases, certain factors
predominate.93 Third, the five Gordon factors are illustrative rather than
exhaustive, and there are factors beyond the five that are often critically
important.94
And above all, it must be remembered that the Gordon factors are
offered for guidance, and that the ultimate test is the balancing test mandated
by Rule 609(a)(1) itself. As the New Mexico Supreme Court instructed,
While these [Gordon] factors may be useful in aiding a
court to fairly determine whether to admit certain prior
convictions, they are not to be considered mechanically or in
isolation. The court should make every effort to strike a
reasonable balance between the interests of the public and
92 See Spicer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 4:06-cv-0149-DFH-WGH, 2007
WL 2363369, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2007) (stating that in that case, two of the five factors
weighed more heavily than the others); United States v. Ball, 547 F. Supp. 929, 934 (E.D.
Tenn. 1981) (stating that depending on the circumstances, different factors receive different
emphasis).
93 For example, in some cases where the previous conviction as for the same
offense as the charged crime, courts have given the third factor extra weight. See, e.g., United
States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bagley, 765 F.2d
836, 841-42 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Coleman, No. 05-CR-295-02, 2006 WL 3208677
at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2006); Jones v. State, 625 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Ark. 1981); State v.
Daly, 623 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Iowa 2004). In other cases, where credibility is especially
important because the trial depends on a swearing match between the defendant and his
accuser, courts have given the fifth factor extra weight. See, e.g., United States v. Pritchard,
973 F.2d 905, 909 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Huff, No. 97-6020, 1998 WL 385555 at *3 (6th Cir. June 30, 1998);
United States v. Spero, 625 F.2d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d
1022, 1028 (1st Cir. 1979); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 45 (Conn. 1998) (citing additional
cases).
94 "This list does not exhaust the range of possible factors, but it does outline the
more basic concerns relevant to the balancing under Rule 609(a)(1)." United States v.
Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980). For example, several courts have noted that
the availability of other means of impeachment reduces the probative value of 609 evidence.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 2004) (McKee, J., concurring);
United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1995); Calver v. Ottawa County, No.
1:98 CV 133, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1765, at *26-27 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2001); People v.
Rist, 545 P.2d 833, 839 (Cal. 1976); State v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 2005); State
v. Gardner, 433 A.2d 249, 252 (Vt. 1981). When the Federal Advisory Committee considered
incorporating the Gordon factors into the text of the rule itself, its proposed rule added this as
an additional factor: "other evidence offered or to be offered by the party to impeach the
witness." 2 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, at 1033.
This approach is consistent with the principles governing Rule 403. As the Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules stated, courts conducting a 403 balancing test should consider
"availability of other means of proof." FED. R. EviD. 403 advisory committee's notes; see also
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 (1997) (holding that under Rule 403, courts
should exclude evidence if the "discounted probative value" is substantially outweighed by
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those of the defendant in disposing of the charges in
accordance with the truth, keeping in mind the high degree
of prejudice often associated with the introduction of a prior
conviction at trial.95
Minnesota's application of the Gordon test has become overly
mechanical. The Gordon factors are not treated as sliding scales; rather, they
are treated as binary switches that are either "satisfied" or "not satisfied. 96
Minnesota courts have rarely recognized that depending on the
circumstances of the case, different factors should receive different weight.97
Nor have they recognized that other factors, such as the availability of other
means of impeachment, should be considered. Applying the Gordon test in
Minnesota is simply a matter of checking five boxes. Because the test is so
mechanical, it serves more to control outcomes than it does to guide
discretion.
F. The Resulting Imbalance
Minnesota's interpretation of Rule 609 and its application of the
Gordon test have thus departed in a variety of ways from the standards that
prevail in other jurisdictions. The combined effect of those departures has
been to make Minnesota's version of the Gordon test almost entirely one-
sided. A rule that was intended to admit some prior felonies while excluding
others has been transformed into a rule that allows (or mandates) the
admission of all felonies. 98 The ideal of balance has been lost.
In a criminal case in Minnesota, the prosecution can admit seemingly
any felony for impeachment under 609(a)(1) because under Minnesota's
interpretation of the Gordon test, the prosecution almost invariably wins each
factor. The prosecution (1) wins the first prong, because under the whole
person doctrine, all crimes are probative of untruthfulness; (2) wins the
second prong for any crime within the ten-year limit; (3) wins the third
prong, even if the prior conviction was for the same crime, so long as the
facts were sufficiently different; (4) wins the fourth prong, because a
95 State v. Trejo, 825 P.2d 1252, 1255-56 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
96 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Minn. 2003); State v. Ihnot, 575
N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998); State v. Diaz, No. A05-1829, 2006 WL 3198937, at *4-5
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2006); State v. Day, No. A05-567, 2006 WL 1460469, at *4 (Minn.
Ct. App. May 30, 2006); State v. Garritsen, No. A04-59, 2004 WL 2856815, at *5 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 14, 2004); State v. Faircloth, No. A03-468, 2004 WL 1152479, at *6 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 25, 2004).
9 Cf. State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006) ("Because only one
of the [Gordon] factors weighs against the admission of Swanson's assault convictions.., the
district court did not abuse its discretion under Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)."); State v. Mitchell,
687 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) ("Because four of five [Gordon] factors weigh in
favor of admitting the impeachment evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial.").
98 See Gold, supra note 82, at 2297-98. ("[T]he Rule expresses a clear preference
for admitting conviction evidence in some situations while excluding it in others.").
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defendant's testimony is often important to the case; and (5) wins the fifth
prong, because a defendant's credibility is often important.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Ihnot provides a striking
example of how one-sided Minnesota's 609 jurisprudence has become and
how far Minnesota has strayed from other jurisdictions. The defendant in
Ihnot was charged with sexual assault, and as impeachment evidence, the
state sought to introduce a nine-year-old sexual assault conviction.99 Under
the standards that prevail in other jurisdictions, such a crime probably would
not have been admitted for impeachment. The prior conviction had limited
probative value because sexual assault convictions have little bearing on
truthfulness and because it was barely within the ten-year limit of Rule
609(b). The prior conviction also had a significant potential for prejudice
because it was for the same offense as the charged crime.
With such minimal probative value and such a high risk of unfair
prejudice, the Ihnot conviction could have served as a paradigmatic example
of a prior offense that ought to be excluded under Gordon and 609(a)(1).
And yet the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the admission of the prior
offense.1 ° In fact, it found that all five Gordon factors favored admission.
101
The one-sidedness of Minnesota's version of the Gordon test can
also be seen by surveying Minnesota appellate court opinions. The
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Gordon test in 1978 in State v.
Jones.10 2 Between 1978 and 2006, 234 appellate court opinions applying
Rule 609 cited Jones.103 215 of those cases involve appeals by criminal
defendants claiming that a trial court improperly admitted their prior
convictions as impeachment. 1°4 Of those 215 cases, the prosecution prevailed
in 214.105 The sole defense victory came in an unpublished Court of Appeals
opinion that pre-dated Ihnot.' 6
Recently, the Court of Appeals held in favor of a defendant
appealing a 609(a)(1) ruling for only the second time since Jones. In State v.
Walker, the defendant was charged with second-degree assault, and the trial
judge admitted for impeachment evidence of a prior second-degree assault
conviction. 10 7 The ruling in Walker is a hopeful sign. Unfortunately, Walker
is arguably inconsistent with Ihnot and its progeny,' °8 and as an unpublished
99 Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 587.
'0o Id. at 588.
10' Id. at 586-87.
102 State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978).
103 See infra Appendix A.
104 See infra Appendix A.
105 See infra Appendix A.
106 State v. Carter, No. C5-97-388, 1998 WL 27240 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 27,
1998).
107 State v. Walker, No. A06-522, 2007 WL 1892886, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. July
3, 2007).
108 For example, in applying the third Gordon factor, the Walker court held that
the similarity of the crimes counted against admission. Id. at *4. In Ihnot, the Minnesota
2008]
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opinion, it is nonprecedential.' ° 9 On the whole, Minnesota courts'
interpretation of Rule 609 and the Gordon test is profoundly one-sided, and
that one-sidedness cannot be effectively cured without intervention from the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrinal and statistical analysis of case law presented above
suggests that Minnesota courts have departed sharply from other jurisdictions
in their interpretation of the Gordon test and Rule 609. There are of course
risks in drawing broad conclusions based solely on the study of appellate
court opinions. It is possible that trial courts in Minnesota apply the Gordon
test differently than appellate courts. Trial court rulings excluding prior
convictions under 609(a)(1) are unlikely to produce appeals. Given that 609
rulings, like most evidentiary rulings, are discretionary, most trial court
rulings should be affirmed, and statistically most are affirmed. It is possible
that the one-sided statistics of appellate opinions interpreting 609 in
Minnesota simply reflect a great deal of deference.
There are two problems with such a dismissive argument. First, Rule
609(a)(1) does not give trial courts unlimited, unreviewable discretion to
admit all felonies for impeachment." 0 The rule grants discretion, but it
requires that the discretion be exercised in a careful, balanced manner."'
When appellate courts simply rubber-stamp the decisions of lower courts,
they perform a disservice to the competing values that Rule 609 reflects.
Second, in exercising their discretion under 609(a)(1), trial courts are
not only guided but also bound by the decisions of appellate courts. When
Minnesota trial courts apply the Gordon factors, they must follow the
Supreme Court's application of those factors in cases like Ihnot. When
dutifully following Ihnot, a trial court could exclude virtually no prior
convictions under 609(a)(1). Minnesota appellate courts' interpretation of the
Gordon factors has become so mechanical and so one-sided that it serves to
Supreme Court held that the third Gordon factor counts in favor of admission so long as the
underlying facts are sufficiently different. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 587.
io9 See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subd 3(c); Vlahos v. R&I Constr., Inc., 676
N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004).
10 Gold, supra note 82, at 2296-97 ("Too often [courts) make the mistake of
assuming that the uncertainties of the Rule's text provide license to exercise virtually
unrestricted discretion. In making this assumption, the courts have largely ignored the
legislative history of Rule 609, which reveals a determined, even if unfinished, congressional
effort to craft a balance between conflicting values.").
11 In part for that reason, many jurisdictions encourage or even require trial courts
to make explicit findings regarding the Gordon factors before admitting convictions under
609(a)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 234 (6th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639
(5th Cir. 1979); State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712,716 (N.D. 2002); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d
984, 986 (Vt. 1993); State v. Sexton, No. 02-0286-CR, 2002 WL 1163820, at *3 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 4, 2002); 2 SALazBuRG E" Ai., supra note 24, at 1044-45.
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extinguish discretion rather than enhancing it. Couching affirmances in the
language of deference only places a veneer of discretion on a structure of
control.
When a rule of evidence creates an open-ended discretionary
standard, it makes sense for appellate courts to create clarifying tests like
Gordon to provide additional guidance. But when the judicially created
clarifying tests become too rigid, they can do a disservice to the underlying
text.
Without question, Minnesota is not the only jurisdiction whose Rule
609 jurisprudence has drifted off course. Illinois, for example, experienced a
similar phenomenon. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Gordon test in
1971 in People v. Montgomery.112 Over time, however, Illinois courts'
interpretation of the test became too mechanical and one-sided, so the Illinois
Supreme Court stepped in to re-affirm the foundational principles of Gordon
and Rule 609:
In People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296 (1994), we revisited
the Montgomery balancing test. We found "a regression
toward allowing the State to introduce evidence of virtually
all types of felony convictions for the purported reason of
impeaching a testifying defendant." Noting that trial courts
often mechanically applied the balancing test to allow more
prior-conviction evidence, we stated, "The Montgomery rule
does not, however, allow for the admission of evidence of
any and all prior crimes. The focus of Montgomery was on
crimes which bear on the defendant's truthfulness as a
witness." Trial courts should not tip the balancing test
toward probative value simply because all felonies show a
disrespect for society and, thus, indicate a willingness to lie
on the witness stand. More importantly, trial courts should
not admit prior-conviction evidence as probative of guilt,
rather than credibility. We reaffirmed that trial courts, in
exercising their discretion to admit evidence of a defendant's
prior convictions, should consider the nature of the prior
crime, its recency and similarity to the current charge, and
the length of the defendant's criminal record. Convictions
for the same crime for which the defendant is on trial should
be admitted sparingly.' 
13
Minnesota has experienced a similar regression. It is time for the Minnesota
Supreme Court to revisit its Rule 609 jurisprudence."
4
n2 268 N.E.2d 695, 699-700 (Il. 1971).
113 People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166, 170 (Ill. 2001) (citations omitted).
114 The Court has so far refused to consider arguments for altering its application
of the Gordon test. In two recent cases, the Court refused to reconsider its Rule 609 doctrine
on the grounds that the defendant had raised the argument for the first time on appeal. State v.
Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 681 (Minn. 2007); State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn.
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2006). Lower courts have no power to alter the Minnesota Supreme Court's Rule 609
doctrine, so presenting such an argument at trial would be an entirely futile, pro forma
exercise. State v. Gilmartin, 535 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). Nonetheless, the
Court apparently considers the pro forma exercise necessary to review.
Most courts consider trial objections unnecessary when they would be futile in light
of settled appellate case law. Guam v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 512 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
cases) (stating "were we to insist that an exception be taken to save the point for appeal, the
unhappy result would be that we would encourage defense counsel to burden district courts
with repeated assaults on then settled principles out of hope that those principles will be later
overturned")
[Vol. 31:2
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APPENDIX
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court set forth the Jones standard
governing admission of prior crimes for impeachment, 215 defendants have
appealed their convictions on the basis of asserted Jones error.'1 5 Only 1 of
those 215 defendants obtained a reversal on the basis of a Jones error.
* 25 Minnesota Supreme Court cases have affirmed the admission of
prior convictions under Jones.
* 57 published Minnesota Court of Appeals cases have affirmed the
admission of prior convictions under Jones.
0 126 unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals cases have affirmed
the admission of prior convictions under Jones.
* 4 Minnesota Court of Appeals cases have declined to reach the Jones
issue squarely and simply affirmed the convictions on harmless error
grounds.
0 1 Minnesota Court of Appeals case reached the Jones issue and
found error but affirmed the conviction on harmless error ground.
0 1 Minnesota Court of Appeals case reversed the conviction on other
grounds and went on to find that the trial court had properly admitted
some prior convictions under Jones but improperly admitted other
prior convictions.
* 1 unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals case reversed a
defendant's conviction for Jones error.
115 As of February 21, 2006, Westlaw reveals that 234 Minnesota court cases have
cited Jones. 215 of those cases presented Jones claims regarding the improper admission of a
defendant's prior crimes for impeachment. The remaining 19 cases cited Jones for reasons
unrelated to the admission of a defendant's prior crimes for impeachment.
3 of the 19 other cases presented claims that the trial court had improperly excluded
Jones evidence offered by the defendant to impeach prosecution witnesses. All 3 of those
cases affirmed trial court's exclusion.
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5. State v. Sims, 526 N.W.2d 201 (Minn. 1994).
6. State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1993).
7. State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. 1993).
8. State v. Thunberg, 492 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1992).
9. State v. Ross, 491 N.W.2d 658 (Minn. 1992).
10. State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1988).
11. State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1984).
12. State v. Amos, 347 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1984).
13. State v. Gutberlet, 346 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1984).
14. State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982).
15. State v. Walker, 310 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 1981).
16. State v. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1981).
17. State v. Ware, 306 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1981).
18. State v. Gorham, 306 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1981).
19. State v. Kvale, 302 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. 1981).
20. State v. Mendoza, 297 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1980).
21. State v. Knight, 295 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 1980).
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22. State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542 (Minn. 1980).
23. State v. Burrows, 295 N.W.2d 100 (Minn. 1980).
24. State v. Graffice, 294 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1980).
25. State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1979).
Published Minnesota Court of Appeals Cases Affirming Admission of
Prior Convictions Under Jones
1. State v. Mitchell, 687 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
2. State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
3. State v. James, 638 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
4. State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
5. State v. Hochstein, 623 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
6. State v. Hofmann, 549 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
7. State v. Kissner, 541 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
8. State v. Clark, 486 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
9. State v. Stallings, 474 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
10. State v. Lund, 474 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
11. Jackson v. State, 447 N.W.2d 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
12. State v. Skinner, 450 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
13. State v. Lynch, 443 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
14. State v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
15. State v. Skramstad, 433 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
16. State v. Thompson, 414 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
17. State v. Case, 412 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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18. State v. Rice, 411 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
19. State v. Porter, 411 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
20. State v. Schwab, 409 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
21. State v. Newman, 408 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
22. State v. Lowmaster, 406 N.W.2d 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
23. State v. French, 402 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
24. State v. Rodriguez Torres, 400 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
25. State v. Meech, 400 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
26. State v. Whiteside, 400 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
27. State v. Fox, 396 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
28. Holmes v. State, 394 N.W.2d 818 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
29. State v. McDonald, 394 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
30. State v. Widell, 393 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
31. State v. Hernandez, 393 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
32. State v. Yates, 392 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
33. State v. Lohmeier, 390 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
34. State v. Alexander, 388 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
35. State v. Griffin, 386 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
36. State v. Page, 386 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
37. State v. Stanifer, 382 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
38. State v. Ford, 381 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
39. State v. Hicks, 380 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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40. State v. Norregaard, 380 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
41. State v. Edwards, 380 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
42. State v. Moseng, 379 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
43. State v. Dye, 371 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
44. State v. Taylor, 365 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
45. State v. Willis, 362 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
46. State v. Ward, 361 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
47. State v. Thomas, 360 N.W.2d 458 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
48. State v. Gravley, 359 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
49. State v. Banks, 358 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
50. State v. McBride, 357 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
51. State v. Givens, 356 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
52. State v. Propotnik, 355 N.W.2d 195 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
53. State v. Fischer, 354 N.W.2d 29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
54. State v. Heidelberger, 353 N.W.2d 582 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
55. State v. Rose, 353 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
56. State v. Nunn, 351 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
57. State v. Ward, 349 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals Cases Affirming Admission of
Prior Convictions Under Jones
1. State v. Scaife, No. 04020959, 2006 WL 330042, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 14, 2006).
2. State v. Frye, Nos. 03066495; 03066005, 2006 WL 163448, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2006).
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